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Abstract 
The core argument of the paper is that the modern philosophical notion of self-
constitution is directed against the prospect of human beings dissolving into 
idleness. Arguments for self-constitution are marked non-philosophical 
presuppositions about the value of usefulness. Those arguments also assume a 
particular conception of superior experience as conscious integration of a person’s 
actions under within an identifiable set of chosen commitments. Exploring 
particular arguments by Hegel, Kant, Korsgaard and Frankfurt the paper claims 
that those arguments are problematic in the various ways in which they suppose 
usefulness and explicitly or implicitly take extra-philosophical views of idleness. 
 
1. Philosophy has, from its earliest days, offered a defence of leisure. Aristotle 
contrasted the energy sapping labours of the physical professions with the leisure 
needed for the fundamentally human enterprise of philosophical thinking. The term he 
used was σχολή, and he had in mind anything but an indolent life. Leisure was not 
idling, that is, the doing of nothing in particular or acting casually and without 
objectives: leisure permitted serious contemplation.1 Bertrand Russell’s “Praise of 
Idleness” proves, in fact, to go no further than its title. He, worried that modern work 
practices deplete our capacities for other activities, actually defends leisure in the 
Aristotelian sense. He wrote: “Leisure is essential to civilisation.”2 The leisured class 
historically had “cultivated the arts and discovered the sciences; it wrote the books, 
invented the philosophies, and refined social relations. Even the liberation of the 
oppressed has usually been inaugurated from above.”3 Leisure, then, is to be 
distinguished from idleness on the basis of its superior purposefulness, the purpose of 
– in effect – providing ideas necessary for the advancement of humanity.4 Leisure is 
either identifiable with our higher capacities: a reflective life is a leisured life. Or 
leisure provides the conditions under which those capacities can be developed: leisure 
may lead to reflective accomplishments. The prospect of superior productivity gives 
leisure a good name. 
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 Without productivity leisure takes on the character of idleness. Outside 
philosophy idleness has often been perceived as an evil for the human character. 
Discussing the discipline of obedience to God Calvin writes: “It just happens to it as 
with refractory horses, which, if kept idle for a few days at hack and manger, become 
ungovernable, and no longer recognize the rider, whose command before they 
implicitly obeyed.”5 The lesson Calvin tries to persuade us of would frame the social 
morality of the industrial revolution. Together with the permanent migration of people 
– increasingly construed as workers – towards centres of employment came the new 
phenomenon of the class of urban unemployed. Their condition was lamented as one 
of “idleness.” In this context the problem of “idleness” has two dimensions. First, the 
unemployed possessed no means of living. Idleness was therefore a direct evil. 
Second, unemployment would entail an unstructured daily life which could lead only 
to irresponsibility and criminality. Idleness was in this sense an indirect evil in that it 
was neither irresponsibility nor a form of maliciousness in itself but freed the 
individual from the salutary (if not edifying) constraints of labour. It is a kind of 
disintegration of the moral character. Observations of the supposedly wild peoples of 
non-European cultures offered frighteningly instructive example to the modern world 
of lives without purpose, mired in idleness. Even Wordsworth – with his romantic 
anxieties about industrialization – had internalized the norm of productive labour. In 
the poem, “Gipsies” he expresses his disgust at the torpor of a gypsy camp that he 
encounters twice in one day, with a twelve hour gap, between the start and finish of 
his (self-importantly) busy day: 
 
– Twelve hours, twelve bounteous hours, are gone while I 
Have been a Traveller under open sky, 
Much witnessing of change and cheer, 
Yet as I left I find them here! 
 
[ … ] 
 
Better vain deeds or evil than such life! 
The silent Heavens have goings on; 
The stars have tasks – but these have none.6 
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Any sort of busyness, then, was preferable to the apparent inertia of the idle. 
Obviously enough, profound differences exist between the experiences of involuntary 
unemployment and the idleness of Wordsworth’s gypsies. The former is indissociable 
from misery, whereas the latter invokes images of ease and a carefree existence. 
However that difference holds only at the level of the direct evil of idleness. The 
indirect evil – disintegration through non-productivity – is where idleness as decried 
by moralists and idleness as gypsy freedom converge. 
 
2. Thus far, two different features of idleness have been noted: (i) non-
productivity and (ii) moral disintegration. In spite of the significant periods of 
idleness for those human lives free of constant duress or necessity philosophy has 
provided this feature of experience with very little analysis and certainly even less 
endorsement. Within some of the foundational modern discussions of agency idleness 
has been identified as in some respect normatively illegitimate. It is to be excluded 
from the scope of what the agent can see as consistent with her sense of agency. This 
is perhaps no surprise when we recall the modern assumption that agency and 
morality somehow reciprocate one another. Idleness is not moral behaviour. More 
deeply, though, the phenomenon of idleness – as distinct from the respectable concept 
of leisure – complicates philosophical theories that construe personhood or agency as 
a kind of achievement. 
 The notion that the self is an achievement pervades the history of philosophy, 
though it has been supported by very different theories. These theories range from 
claims about the capacities of the subject to produce its own distinctive practical 
agency to theorizations of agency as an essentially intersubjective phenomenon. 
Philosophers have also claimed, from long before the modern era, that in order for the 
subject to gain the truth of itself it must painfully detach itself from its social 
environment. The theory of self-achieving that I want to look at falls into the first 
category, the one which explains the development of the self as an agent in the world 
as a process of active self-constitution. This theory has systematically – i.e. as a direct 
corollary of its principles – denigrated idle experience as it seeks to establish some 
kind of normative pre-eminence for the achieved self. 
 The theory of self-constitution originates in Kant’s idea of the moral agent (to 
be discussed in more detail in 4. below). Self-constitution involves the self in some 
kind of winning negotiation with itself in which the self overcomes its own 
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diffuseness in order to give its actions integral purpose. Its life thereby takes on a 
discernible structure because it is now normatively guided. This thesis has been given 
revised formulation in recent times by Christine Korsgaard (to be discussed in more 
detail in 5. below) but it is also found in non-deontological form in Harry Frankfurt’s 
work (section 6. below). Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay on existentialism is a popular 
expression of this philosophical idea, and it emphasizes one of the theory of self-
constitution’s central claims; namely, not only do we constitute ourselves but that we 
have some kind of an unavoidable obligation to do so: “Man makes himself; he is not 
found ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of his morality, and he cannot but 
choose a morality.”7 We humans are made of self-constituting choosing, whether we 
like it or not: not choosing is itself therefore some kind of self-constituting choice, 
albeit one of bad faith. Passivity, inertia, indifference to one’s situation are likewise 
self-determining. This claim is established by Sartre by little more than insistence, but 
he is simply pursuing the model, in which agency is a kind of intense self-occupation, 
set down by Kant and Fichte. The kind of obligation at work is – as I think will 
become clearer below – a misleading mixture of ineluctable natural necessity and 
normative preference. 
 Few expressions of resistance to this characterization of human beings as 
busy, self-constituting agents are found among philosophically minded thinkers. 
Among the earliest, and most perceptive, are Friedrich Schlegel’s. His character 
Julius, in Lucinde (1799), proclaims an “Idyll upon Idleness” likening it not to σχολή 
but to the “godlike art” of indolence (Faulheit).8 It is a “liberal carelessness and 
inactivity.”9 He also characterizes the general comportment of idleness as 
“passivity,”10 in fact, as “pure vegetating” (reines Vegetieren).11 He contrasts the 
attitude of the idler with that of “self-conceit”12 (Eigendünkel) where the individual is 
caught up only in the imperatives of “industry and utility,” which he darkly describes 
as “the angels of death.”13 He identifies Prometheus, “the inventor of education and 
enlightenment,”14 as the source not only of these inexplicable imperatives but also – 
in effect – the goal of self-constitution to be achieved through the performance of 
these imperatives: “It’s from him [Prometheus] that you inherited your inability to 
stay put and your need to be constantly striving. It’s also for this reason that, when 
you have absolutely nothing else to do you foolishly feel compelled to aspire to having 
a personality…”15 Julius, then, seems to be progressing the notion of idleness in a 
radical – socially critical – manner: (i) idleness defies industry, utility, means and 
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ends, (ii) happiness is conceived as passivity rather than restless activity and (iii) 
idleness is a decentering experience in which the self abandons self-absorption. Other 
elements of the Idyll, though, show that Julius does not make good on this radical 
conception. He also thinks of idleness as providing us with the conditions under 
which one can “remember one’s whole ego and contemplate the whole of life.”16 It is 
not clear how this stands in relation to Eigendünkel. And more conventionally 
idleness can permit “inspiration” (Begeisterung) in which the “thinking and writing of 
poetry” may take place.17 In this regard idleness resonates with one of the traditional 
philosophical features of leisure. In spite of these complexities, though, Julius’ critical 
insights against what he calls “Nordic barbarity”18 will, as we shall see, have 
significant relevance in the theorization of idleness as criticism of self-constitution. 
 
3. Let me describe the phenomenon of idleness as I understand it. First there are 
its phenomenological features. Idleness, which is a variety of behaviour, is 
experienced as unfocused and only vaguely, if at all, as purposeful. It is restful and 
pleasurable though there may be discomfort if idleness prevents one from completing 
a task of some significance. There is a sense of freedom throughout the duration of 
idle behaviour: a feeling of non-compulsion and drift. We become idle by slipping 
into it, either in the middle of tasks or for extended periods. The structure of our 
individual lives permits idleness in varying degrees, depending on the level of our 
commitments and the seriousness with which we take them. In principle, it is possible 
to imagine a life which is largely idle, that is, in which idleness is not a momentary 
release from work. Deliberate idleness – once theorized among a certain class as the 
art of being idle – is something else precisely because of its deliberateness: it is a way 
of life, carefully pursued.19 Second are its effective dimensions. The activities which 
fill an idle period of behaviour are non-productive. Should an interesting thought, of 
value to ongoing or future projects, arise during idleness this is serendipitous. The 
effective dimension is more important than the phenomenological one in enabling us 
to insist that idleness is not, after all, an effort to make something of oneself, even in 
bad faith. And this takes us to the third dimension of idle behaviour, its structure. It 
just does not come with the structure of choice. Absent from it is the reflexivity 
required by the theory of self-determination, that is, of a self that monitors itself – 
even intermittently – to ensure that it is acting on its maxims, goals or desires. 
Likewise, although it is an experience of non-compulsion, idleness is not to be 
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construed as a form of autonomy (in the over-burdened philosophical sense), since it 
is not a process within which thematized justifications can even retrojectively be 
identified. However, it is not mindless: no less than non-idle behaviour it contains 
conceptual and judicative components. The mind is not switched off. It cannot 
therefore be interpreted as essentially irrational. To interpret it in that way is to 
prejudice the notion of rationality by claiming it for self-determining or self-
constituting actions only. 
 I do not want to identify idleness either as an imperative – as something we 
ought to pursue or leave ourselves open to – or as superior human behaviour (as 
Schlegel’s Julius does and likewise the persona of Kierkegaard’s “The Rotation 
Method”20). There may be people who either never experience idleness or dislike it. 
If, as Santoro Brienza puts it, “[h]omo sapiens comes to light through our profile as 
homo faber and homo laborans”21 idleness will be a challenge to those who 
understand what makes them truly human as self-negotiation: it may be meaningless 
to them or perhaps offensive to their self-conceptions. That is a self-conception that 
philosophy has somehow taken to be the definition of meaningful life itself. And it is 
this self-conception in its philosophical formulations that this paper addresses. What I 
am attempting here is simply to put into question the justifications – such as that are – 
offered for the peculiar necessity for self-constitution. 
 Idleness might seem to be explicable within the framework of Galen 
Strawson’s distinction between self-narrativity and episodic experience. Idle 
experience appears to be a space of experience very squarely outside what Strawson 
ascribes to narrative selfhood, which is: “diachronic self-experience” where one 
considers oneself “as a self, as something that was there in the (further past) and will 
be there in the (further future)”22; narcissistic; an effort at autobiographical “form-
finding”23; and “story-telling,”24 (stories which may come to be revised25). But the 
matter does not rest there. A person with narrative tendencies could well be given to 
idleness yet wish to account for his idleness experience by construing it as an element 
within a processual outcome. That is to say, the narrativist might not disavow idle 
experience and instead chose to incorporate it within his autobiography. Equally, 
though, the narrativist might feel alarm at a life that was more or less idly pursued. 
Indeed Strawson suggests that this is the view the narrativist might take towards his 
contrary, the episodist (not the idler), about whom he “may feel that there is 
something chilling, empty and deficient”26 about a life not self-understood in 
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diachronic terms, that is as episodic. Strawson’s proposal contains a compelling 
philosophical insight: its criticism that self-narration as an act of self-construction has 
prompted a whole tradition of thinking about an enduring moral agent as a necessary 
condition of intelligible moral action. Strawson believes that the episodist can pursue 
a moral life27 regardless of the discontinuities in the episodist’s self-understanding. 
The full range of temporally referenced moral experience – e.g. guilt and 
responsibility for past actions – can be accommodated within an episodic conception 
of the self.28 The reflective achievements of self-understanding need not depend on 
diachronic narratives. Strawson’s project is to detach the possibility of morality from 
narrativity. It should, therefore, be evident from this that what the notion of idle 
experience that I am developing therefore falls outside Strawson’s framework. 
Episodic moral action is no less purposeful and intentional than its narrative 
alternative. Though not engaged in any acts of self-constitution the episodist can 
nevertheless be an agent in active pursuit of what he or she takes to be the good. The 
idler – if my account captures any reality – is blissfully withdrawn from that pursuit. 
Strawson’s dichotomy refers to two opposing styles of self-understanding, whereas 
idleness refers to an alternative form of self-relation to that which the theory of self-
constitution makes fundamental. 
 
4. Kant explores the question of idleness only briefly, though at a crucial 
moment in his development of a theory of rational agency. Idleness presents itself to 
him as a challenge to the idea of life as commitment to self-constitution in accordance 
with the laws of practical reason. And he emotively identifies the opposing 
conception of life with the inferior spaces of an exotic and unenlightened society. The 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals offers a number of test cases with which to 
illustrate the rational compellingness of the “universal imperative of duty,” the 
imperative, namely, to “act as if your maxim were to become by your will a universal 
law of nature.”29 In one of these instances Kant considers the case of a man who could 
cultivate a talent that would “make him a human being useful for all sorts of 
purposes.”30 However, this man is something of an idler who is indifferent to his 
talents. He nevertheless decides to subject his casual preference for this self-neglect to 
the test of the universal imperative of duty. Kant does not explain why the idler might 
take this decision. By setting out his thought experiment in these terms, though, Kant 
prepares us for the outcome that will affirm his views of what we should do and be. 
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There are two assumptions that influence the formulation of this thought experiment. 
First, Kant assumes that this idle man will give authority to reason. He is construed as 
one who is oriented towards the business of justification in accordance with reasons. 
He is not really neutral, therefore, between reason and idleness. Second, Kant assumes 
that this man has an interest in what kind of person he is going to be. This means that 
he will be hospitable to what might contribute to his (self-) constitution, over an 
existence of drifting from experience to experience. The idler, for Kant, will therefore 
be responsive to the norm of self-realization and will reflect on whether he has 
actually realized himself by neglecting his talents. 
 Kant argues that a system of nature could, in fact, “subsist” with “a universal 
law,” where idleness was to be the basic state of the human community. This would 
be possible even though, as he writes, “(as with the South Sea Islanders) the human 
being should let his talents rust and be concerned with devoting his life merely to 
idleness (Müßiggang), amusement (Ergötzlichkeit), procreation (Fortpflanzung) – in a 
word to enjoyment (Genuß).”31 However, no rational being, he specifies, could will 
idleness either as a “universal law” or for it to “be put in us as such by means of 
natural instinct.”32 The rational being, rather, wills the full realization of all his 
capacities since “they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible 
purposes.”33 It is, though, obscure as to what any given individual’s capacities might 
happen to be. And it is an open question for any individual as to whether the 
capacities they believe they have are worthy – both intrinsically and in terms of their 
agreeableness to the individual – of the endeavour needed to realize them. (A similar 
issue is raised by John Rawls’ case of the blades of grass counter.34)  
 A question about the nature of the rationality of self-realization presents itself. 
If there are individuals who experience no urge to cultivate purposeful talents and that 
it is not impossible for a system of nature to subsist with a race of idlers, what force 
does the self-improvement imperative have over us, particularly as a rational 
imperative? Kant has to hold – question beggingly, it seems to me – that it is in some 
sense irrational to be indifferent to the obligations to ourselves that are occasioned by 
our potential for all kinds of usefulness. Endeavouring to become useful rather than 
idle, then, is consistent with the will of a rational being. This places the weight of 
what is to count as rational on to the socially determined idea of what is to count as 
useful. What this means, though, is that the will of a rational being is ideally 
responsive to the prevailing social norms of usefulness and functions in harmony with 
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the conventional worry about idleness (though for higher “philosophical” reasons). 
The social norm of virtuous busyness and the specific historical roles it recognizes 
(the useful ones) turn out to be determiners of rationality. This hardly meets the 
standards of lawlikeness that Kant attributes to the choices of the autonomous rational 
will.  
 In view of Hegel’s efforts both to capture the historical content of our social 
norms and to provide an account of our agency as a property of recognition driven 
intersubjectivity it is hardly surprising that he should explicitly connect self-
realization with the contingent needs of others. The notion of usefulness – which 
according to my interpretation is difficult to accommodate within Kant’s conception 
of the rational agent – fits within this intersubjective frame. Like Kant Hegel regards 
idleness as a non-rational activity. He shares with Kant the view that it is uselessness 
which defines the non-rationality of idleness. In the Philosophy of Right he claims that 
whereas theoretical education enables our capacity to deal with abstract ideas it is 
practical education that develops us as useful social beings. He writes: “Practical 
education through work consists in the self-perpetuating need and habit of being 
occupied in one way or another, in the limitation of one’s activity to suit both the 
nature of the material in question and, in particular, the arbitrary will of others, and in 
a habit, acquired through this discipline, of objective activity and universally 
applicable skills.”35 He then goes on to contrast the “educated” or developed man 
(Gebildeten) with the “dull and solitary brooding (Stumpfheit)” of the lazy 
“barbarian.”36 This passage obviously contains a number of claims: (1) that a good of 
work is that the worker limits herself in response to (1a) the preferences of the social 
environment (“the arbitrary will of others”) and (1b) to the limits of the task in hand 
(“the nature of the material in question”); (2) through this process one develops a self-
perpetuating need to keep busy, and thereby, we can infer, to avoid idleness. It is (2) 
that reveals an assumption that Hegel shares with Kant: an insistence that one must 
work in order to gain normative standing (in contrast to the despised barbarian). We 
can easily see that the barbarian possesses self-perpetuating habits that suffice for his 
mode of self-preservation, but he is nevertheless inferior because he is lazy. In his 
Stumpfheit he does not participate in socially validated work practices: he is 
withdrawn from the world. He works only when necessary for his continuing physical 
existence. By contrast, the practically educated or properly formed person involved in 
the self-perpetuation of a personal activity contributes to the perpetuation of society. 
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The educated person is superior to the barbarian in that he is willing to work when the 
material productions of work are not required.37 The very process of becoming an 
agent in the social world is determined by acquiring prestigious and useful though 
existentially unnecessary habits. Kant, as we have seen, faces the difficulty of 
establishing his notion of rational agency when he relies on contextual factors of what 
is to count as useful: usefulness and rationality come into tension in his account. 
Hegel, by contrast, can boldly state the value of habitual work practices because, 
presumably, the self-perpetuating worker gains recognition within the distinctive 
historical social arrangements in which he is available as a worker. 
 
5. The difficulty that Kant faces in his argument against idleness stems from his 
efforts to connect work, usefulness and rationality (and that is true of Hegel also). 
Ultimately, as I have tried to show, Kant’s imperative of self-realization is either 
social (utility has an historical content) and is therefore not neutrally rational, or it is 
simply a preference for the self-occupied self. Kant’s notion of the self-negotiating 
rational agent, in this light, begins to look like a piece of philosophical superstructure, 
determined by the base of some implicit “work ethic.” If that is the case then we must 
lose a certain degree of naiveté: rational self-constitution may be accused of being a 
normatively infused conception of human behaviour. That conception can be carried 
forward only at the cost of the complexity of agential experience. Among other 
aspects of this experience, idleness will be made to disappear. This trajectory, I want 
to argue next, is found in Christine Korsgaard’s conception of agency. She takes as a 
given the conception of a person self-occupied with decisions and consequent actions 
geared towards self-integration and the formation of an effective practical identity.  
 A fundamental principle of Korsgaard’s theory of agency is that agency is the 
achievement of a process that we individually undertake. And it is not a process 
which we can choose to reject: “Carving out a personal identity for which we are 
responsible is one of the inescapable tasks of human life,”38 she writes. Our rationality 
– which Korsgaard does not consider in terms of historical social arrangements or the 
institutional requirements of these arrangements – places that challenge on us. Non-
rational beings – animals – do not need to consider how to constitute themselves. But 
we cannot avoid it. It is a given for beings like us: it is simply a natural fact about the 
human condition that this burden, and its intrinsic normativity – the process of 
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becoming responsible for ourselves – falls upon us. Were we somehow able to resist it 
we would consequently be without reason “to act and to live.”39  
 Creating this personal identity – self-constituting – is accomplished through 
the decisions we make about what practical identity we might prefer to have. In neo-
Sartrean register Korsgaard writes: “I am going to argue that in the relevant sense 
there is no you prior to your choices and actions, because your identity is in a quite 
literal way constituted by your choices and actions.”40 By constituting ourselves as 
integrated complexes we create ourselves as beings with meaning and self-purpose. 
We have standards by which to judge our actions too, standards that are supplied by 
the kind of agent we want to be. Being someone in particular involves self-legislated 
delimitation. It means becoming an agent with defined tasks: “We owe it to ourselves, 
to our own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and 
dedication.”41 The nature of that debt is unexplained, but it is apparently rather 
pressing. There are roles – presumably pre-established – which serve as options for 
us, and if we find one that suits our talents and inclinations we will bind ourselves to 
it. Adopting a role and making it our own is what self-constitution requires.42 
(Perhaps it is significant that the relationship we must have with our roles, as 
Korsgaard describes it, resembles Calvin’s idea of a “good work,” the “first part” of 
which “is the will, the second is the vigorous effort in doing it.”43) 
 The origin of our initial encounters with the forms of life that will become part 
of our identity may, Korsgaard says, be a matter of contingency.44 But as they become 
the content of an identity we self-constitute we cease to experience them as 
preferences we might voluntarily abandon. “Making the contingent necessary,” 
Korsgaard writes, “is one of the tasks of human life and the ability to do it is arguably 
a mark of a good human being.”45 The contingent becomes necessary as we order our 
desires or preferences under normative principles. That is how “the ongoing struggle 
for integrity, the struggle for psychic unity”46 is addressed. Becoming someone and 
being a normatively structured entity belong to a single process. To be a unified agent 
is to be a moral agent. Korsgaard has arguments to support the notion that an immoral 
agent is not properly constituted (arguments which have been strongly and 
persistently criticized since the appearance of her Sources of Normativity47). A good 
person is, as Korsgaard defines it, “someone with standards, someone with integrity, 
someone who is able to govern herself.”48 That governance must be enacted when one 
feels no desire to act in accordance with one’s role. The experience of what we ought 
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to do or be is the experience of normative necessitation. She writes: “Normative 
standards… are the principles by which we achieve the psychic unity that makes 
agency possible. The work of achieving psychic unity, the work that we experience as 
necessitation, is what I am going to call self-constitution.”49 We undertake this 
“work” though it may sometimes be painful to us. Kant also could see no reason to 
weigh pleasure and idleness over the exertions of self-realization since the latter falls 
on the side of rationality. Korsgaard adopts a similar standpoint: “being a person, 
having a personal identity, being a rational agent, is in itself a form of work. And the 
experience of necessitation, with its elements of effort and even of pain, is the 
experience of a form of work.”50 Standing in the way of that achievement are certain 
sorts of possible failings: “Timidity, idleness, and depression will exert their claims in 
turn, will attempt to control or overrule my will, to divert me from my work.”51 The 
self-struggle is caused by some form of necessitation to self-constitute and it appears 
to involve a kind of violence against an inner recalcitrance, against a tendency we 
have to not to want to form an identity for ourselves. That this necessitation is a 
source of pain might well be a reason to question its governing authority over us. This 
question is not raised by Korsgaard, however: it is cut off by the insistence that self-
constitution is a must which is nevertheless not a matter of choice. It is therefore not 
an ought in any familiar sense. 
 We might also ask who or what is feeling the pain that is characteristic of this 
necessitation? What part of a person – there must be some – is reacting against the 
demand of self-constitution since there is apparently “no you prior to your choices 
and actions, because your identity is in a quite literal way constituted by your choices 
and actions”? This seems to leave the experience of “necessitation” without a 
location, at least if we think of necessitation as the experience of doing something that 
our prior inclinations do not orient us towards spontaneously.52  
 This complexity is the outcome of Korsgaard’s denial on the basis of principle 
of agency as sometimes indifferent to acts that are construable as contributions to a 
self-constituting process. That there may be meaningful experiences that lies outside 
that process is excluded. She provides an account of action to support this exclusivity, 
arguing that “to regard some movement of my mind or my body as my action, I must 
see it as an expression of myself as a whole, rather than as a result of some force that 
is at work on me or in me.”53 Note that ownership of action is set out in this binarial 
way: as an expression of myself as a whole or as an alien force. It would be 
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reasonable to say – as Korsgaard I think intends – that actions that cannot be 
attributed to either my intellectual or intentional physical “causality” cannot be 
attributed to me personally. But is the contrary of an unattributable action one that can 
be recognized as an expression of me as a whole? Korsgaard herself expands on the 
latter as “my entire nature working as an integrated whole.”54 But this seems to 
overload the notion of an actor. We might ask: what is on the list of what forms the 
“entire nature” of a person? And would all of my free activities be systematic or 
organically connected moments of a whole nature? These questions cannot bear 
fruitful answers, but the very notion of an “entire nature” or “the person as a whole, as 
a unity” seems to provoke them.55 Instead, it seems to me more realistic to think of 
actions as reflective of the interests one has at time, some indeed of which may be 
expressions of what one takes oneself to be. But others not at all. 
 And this returns us the question of idle behaviour. If we cannot move away 
from the notion of the investment of the whole person in an action the phenomenon of 
idleness can be given no theoretical expression. It is neither integrating nor prompted 
by integrity. Nor is idle experience a variety of self-alienation or a process in which 
identities compete. It is experience one simply and unproblematically without any 
reference to self-making recognizes as one’s own. We can evade this only by 
transferring the concept of a person to the process of the integration of desires within 
a single and – as I have suggested – contestable historical conception of what kind of 
agents agents themselves want to be. 
 
6. As a final case study in the history of self-constitution as a repudiation of 
idleness I want to examine to Harry Frankfurt’s conception of “what we care about,” a 
conception he developed in order to provide some explanation, which deontological 
ethics does not, of what is “important to us” in decisions about how to act.56 He 
claims that as “for the notion of what a person cares about, it coincides in part with 
the notion of something with reference to which the person guides himself in what he 
does with his life and in his conduct.”57 Frankfurt then sets out, in effect, a list of 
characteristics of care-type behaviour and the agent properties required for that 
behaviour. It is not stated that they are strict criteria nor whether they are all necessary 
in order for us to be able to determine that what a person finds important is also 
something they care about. 
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 Care, Frankfurt claims, “consists in guiding oneself along a distinctive 
course.”58 In order to be capable of caring in this sense there must be “both agency 
and self-consciousness.”59 He goes on to describe care-type activities as essentially 
“reflexive,”60 indicating some kind of thematized self-awareness: knowing what one 
is undertaking as one undertakes it. The degree of self-possession that is implied by 
this reflexivity is notable. According to Frankfurt care-type activities are purposive – 
in the sense of intentional – and he claims that it is because they are purposive that 
they are reflexive. What he seems to mean is that the purpose or intention is borne in 
mind through the action. To act purposefully with success, at any rate, means acting 
out and not drifting away from the purpose. Something that one cares about, perhaps, 
holds the agent in such a way as to exclude that drifting. Indeed, this might be 
explained by what Frankfurt describes with the curious metaphor of a personal 
investment: a “person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it.”61 That 
person, he continues, using categories that are more familiar from rational choice 
theory, “identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes himself 
vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon whether what he cares 
about is diminished or enhanced.”62 There is, according to Frankfurt, a characteristic 
of devotedness in our relationship to what we care about. Finally, there is some kind 
of what we might call temporal self-consciousness in that, as Frankfurt puts it, the 
“outlook of a person who cares about something is inherently prospective; that is, he 
necessarily considers himself as having a future.”63 The thing that one cares about is 
an ongoing project in which the agent sees, if not secures, part of her identity. 
Frankfurt’s, then, conceives of the person as a kind of self-achievement.  
 Frankfurt separates caring from simple desiring. Caring involves the 
individual in some kind of self-negotiating acts, whereas desires “can occur in a life 
which consists merely in a succession of separate moments, none of which the subject 
recognizes – either when it occurs or in anticipation or in memory – as an element 
integrated with others in his own continuing history.”64 Integration, then, is achieved 
though acting out of what we care about. Desires, by contrast, do not register 
themselves within the subject’s self-conception. Defined in this way – as a direct 
contrary of intregrational acts – desires at least resemble idleness as I have described 
it. It is difficult to recall what one was doing whilst idling. None of its components, as 
one drifts from element to element, is necessarily connected and nor are those 
components identifiable as part of one’s life projects or ongoing concerns. There is 
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none of what Frankfurt calls “wholeheartedness.”65 The subject is not reflexively 
involved in this aimless sequence of somehow absorbing activities. There is no self-
negotiation. Frankfurt claims that in the case of a succession of desires, which do not 
form any part of the subject’s care behaviour, “there is no continuing subject.”66 It is 
all or nothing, because, quite extraordinarily, that the “lives of some animals are 
presumably like that.”67 The person who cares, however, “necessarily binds” the 
pertinent moments of her care projects “together.”68 There is a “steadiness of 
behavior.”69 In caring about what is important the steady person “guides himself away 
from being critically affected by anything – in the outside world or within himself – 
which might divert him or dissuade him either from following that course or from 
caring as much as he does about following it.”70 Caring, then, turns out not to be 
exclusively a description of how the things that are important to us determine our 
decisions.71 
 
7. The purpose for which this analysis visited various statements from the self-
constitution tradition was to demonstrate the territorial ambitions of that tradition over 
what is to count as meaningful experience. Determined to identify what we essentially 
are with actions motivated by the ongoing project of integration the self itself 
somehow becomes the agent of its own delimitation. And it does so in the name of 
rationality. But, as we have seen, in light of the phenomenon of idle experience, the 
arguments supporting this thesis are unusually brutal. Kant recommends that the 
indifference to oneself that is characteristic of the idler can be overcome by making 
oneself into something useful, yet the definition of usefulness belongs to the 
contingent conditions of any given society not to rationality. Hegel, though less 
explicitly interested in self-constitution, worries that idleness produces a self that is 
indifferent to society without explaining what kind of impairment this is. This 
condition is identified as a deficiency to be overcome by – again – making oneself 
useful. Among the contemporary philosophers considered here usefulness is not the 
criterion of a constituted person. But that leads not to a more appropriate conception 
of the achieved self or person, that is, one free of the “ethic” that compromised the 
German Idealists’ conceptions. Rather, deprived of any reason (such as usefulness) 
why one ought to self-constitute dogmatic naturalism becomes the justification: we 
must (not ought), we are humans (not animals). 
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  In fact this indifference to the matter of second-order volitions is evidence of an absence of 
freedom. Frankfurt thinks of freedom as the process in which the person aligns her will with her 
second-order volitions. Should she suffer, for instance, from some powerful addiction that makes it 
difficult for her successfully to align her will and second-order volition she will experience this as a 
“lack” of freedom (ibid., p. 21). Her attempts at self-negotiation fail. The wanton, however, for whom 
the question of this alignment never arises does not qualify as a being to whom freedom could apply: 
“Since he has no volitions of the second order, the freedom of his will cannot be a problem for him. He 
lacks it, so to speak, by default” (ibid., p. 17). 
 Idleness, if my description is accurate, is also a mindless indifference to immediate desires. 
The idler has no interest in reflexively aligning desires and volition in the manner set out by Frankfurt 
for the self-negotiating agent. Since the idler (recall Wordsworth’s Gypsies) and the wanton are 
relevantly similar in this regard it would seem to follow that the idler, as a non-person, is unfree. Yet 
this seems to be strikingly at odds with the experience. By locating the operations of freedom within 
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